IJCAS International Journal of Culture and Art Studies Inventing Latin America Under the Good Neighborhood Policy: The Case of the MoMA Collection, 1943

. This article describes the strategies of the North American government to help establish a Latin American Collection in the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) and the role that Lincoln Kirstein had as a collector of the works that made up the collection. The dialogue that Kirstein had with various personalities of the culture in the tasks of exhibition and collection is analyzed. We emphasize how the fine arts were spaces of political weighting, and areas usable by Good Neighbor politics. Finally, it is explained what kind of Latin American art was collected to make up the collection in 1943, and what idea of Latin America was represented through that selection. The research uses primary sources collected from MoMA Archives, Rockefeller Personal Archives, New York Public Library and Lincoln Kirstein Archives. The comparative method in history was used to review the different cases analyzed.


Introduction
In as Ricardo Salvatore calls it, but these programs also had to be a political instrument to control damage of Nazi actions in South America.
The OCIAA carried out two central strategies to consolidate its presence in the region. The first was to exhibit. The role of the Arts Committee was to assist in the preparation of the exhibition of "American Contemporary Painting" in 1941 and select the works that would be featured in this exhibition. The second was to create a collection of Latin American art in the United States.
Therefore, the last strategy was to collect.
World fairs, such as the 1939 New York World's Fair or the Golden Gate International Exposition  to enable artists, be they painters, musicians, sculptors or any one of the many aspects of art which appeared on the scene, how could they ever be made to be self-supporting, to eat regularly?" (MoMA, 1987). Even with this influence, the decision to entrust him with purchasing works of art to complete a collection was essential and perhaps excessive. In the first case, it was proposed as a historical vision of Mexican art, portraying an artistic diversity that was already known in New York circles. The exhibition presented an integrated idea of Mexican culture based on the historical development of Mexican art. However, the radicalism of the muralists disappeared. Furthermore, a history without conflicts was represented.
Proud of his economic and cultural negotiation achievement with President Lázaro Cárdenas, Rockefeller called it "the greatest installation ever undertaken in the museum" (Vicario, 2015, p. 197 representations, Portinari "is producing mural decorations for a semi-fascist government" (Brown 1940, 10). Some may seem ignorant or negligent regarding the political repression of the Brazilian Government, but others, like Brown, would not make that concession, which caused discomfort in the political environment. There was no doubt that the enhancement of his work had a clear political sense, and it was helpful to both countries. An international magazine titled its cover with "Portinari comes as Good Neighborhood emissary," and his presentation was understood as representing this policy.
Lincoln Kirstein visited Brazil in 1942 and had a similar concern. The Vargas government was a dictatorship. In this regard, he asked Nelson Rockefeller and Archibald MacLeish, a leading intellectual who participated in the OCIAA committees, to intervene in favor of the artists, but did not get any answers. The Good Neighborhood policy did not mean intervention in the internal affairs of South American governments, and U.S. officials did not expect to break this rule. The contradiction between defending the freedom of the hemisphere and having good relations with a government that persecuted opponents was challenging to cope with. Still, realpolitik and war were imposed on considerations about freedom.

The Collection Process
"Lincoln Kirstein is going to Rio on a mysterious and important mission. No one knows if he is going to paint the Corcovado purple or put on a ballet at Congonhas do Campo." Robert Smith to Candido Portinari, (Smith,1942   Although the catalog followed an order by country, the show had another configuration. It began with the "modern primitives" in the first gallery, placing those who had some European training in the following modules of the exhibition. As Greet states, the exhibition's composition "reinforced the notion that art from south of the border was naive and disconnected from In the context of the OCIAA, art representatives found themselves at a crossroads in which politics were linked to aesthetic assessments. Within this framework, institutions, such as In an attempt to neutralize the competition, Morley let Barr know that there was enough space for different specialists within the field of Latin American art. She asserted that "There is enough work for all who possibly can become interested in a generation or more and there will still be more left to do after that" (Morley, 1943a).
Morley sent a letter to Alfred Barr in May 1943, mentioning Kirstein's resentment for her. She did not understand why he was trying to separate her from a field that she had helped build. She hinted at not understanding why none of her writings on Latin American art were mentioned: After all, I threw everything I knew into the common fund, and he must have had access to my report. He certainly had my blessing on making of it any use he could as everyone [who] works in the field and adds to the knowledge that I had only time to note in the most summary way. I rejoiced when I knew that one more person was interested in the subject and had the opportunity to do something about it (Morley, 1943a).
Alfred Barr eased the situation and tried to reassure her by saying there was nothing against her.
Finally, Kirstein sent her a letter, and told her he felt troubled by the atmosphere of friction between each other: "It is perfectly true that I had stated publicly, and in letters that I have a different opinion of Latin American painting then yourself and particularly of individual painters, but I have always vastly admired your courageous pioneering in the field and your enthusiasm and generosity towards the whole picture" (Kirstein, 1943b). Later, Morley told Barr that, after receiving the letter, she was sure that she was poorly informed: "I could not believe you could have any ill will towards me." (Morley 1943b) Aware that the starting point of the tension was his fierce defense of Pettoruti's work, the following paragraph was intended to let him know that there were still ripples from the painter's trip, and she pointed out that "well-informed people seem to coincide with my feelings that he cannot be considered of any a fascist way. On the other hand, I think he is not a communist, and my impression is that he is very little interested in politics" (Morley 1943c).
Kirstein was critical of the Europeanizing environment he found in some countries in South America, particularly Chile and Argentina, and was also disappointed because they did not seem to recognize American technical supremacy in their intellectual and artistic circles. That impression was political, since he thought that the United States was not valued as it should regarding its contributions towards the continent's security. Some of his writings paint a complete picture of his concern and disappointment with the state of affairs in South America: "The Continent has never been less safe for us. Maybe the north (Peru) is ok. However, here it stinks." (Kirstein 1942b Siqueiros, whose mural in Chillán, as we saw, had made a deep impression on him. In his opinion, the murals were magnificent and challenging, and he found them marvelous: "I think Siqueiros is the great painter of the Western Hemisphere." (Kirstein, 1942c  Argentina. Kirstein believed that the Government was betting on a complete German victory. He thought that the Nazis had indirect and specific propaganda, and U.S. diplomacy did not possess reliable and sufficient information to design an effective strategy. In a report to Nelson Rockefeller, Kirstein examined different strategies to make propaganda more efficient. He recommended taking advantage of the sectorial differences between the landowners ("the estancieros," as he called them) and the growing industrial classes to promote different ideas.
From his perspective, the landowners were pro-fascists because they had an enormous fear of communism, and the petty bourgeoisie did not have a significant political influence, so, in the case of an Axis victory, both classes would benefit. Therefore, he concluded that Argentina was more afraid of an Allied victory than a German one. In short, the political propaganda of the United States had failed, although he had hoped to be able to contribute to improving the situation. classifying were parts of the "exhibition complex." He and Barr agreed to acquire the most significant amount of work to select. Although their concern revolved around artists, they were interested in aesthetic valuation. This concern expressed the issue of quality and the possibility of installing these artists in the gallery circuits. Therefore, it is interesting to note those who were selected for the exhibition. Some painters were already recognized as creators of the art of international relevance since the thirties, as in the case of Rivera, Orozco, or Portinari; others were new to the American stage.
In his obstinate comparison with the United States, he reached a predictable conclusion: American painting was "stronger, more vigorous and reborn," reinforcing his interpretation's centralist and national character. His trip also convinced him that truly modern and national art was his country.

Conclusions
The When we review the exhibitions, we see that, although there is a constant concern about the nations' relative weight, this is not the case for artwork. The comparison of exhibition catalogs from the Riverside Museum exhibitions from 1939 and 1940 and the MoMA reveals that not many pieces are repeated. This is an interesting point. Although high-quality art came from the same nations and artists, there was a diversity of works circulating. Even with these limitations, Latin American art was consolidated in the United States and circulated, such as the Pettoruti exhibition at the SFMOMA. Other institutions such as the PAU (Pan American Union) carried out an intense task of making South American art known through different devices such as publications, posters, copies, and talks. Undoubtedly, these were crucial years in American efforts to pursue an active policy of good neighborhood and win "the minds and hearts" of the neighbors.
When studying the plans of the Rockefeller-led office and the initiatives of some of its participants, we know that it was an institutional complex that took place with multiple edges and developments.
In June 1943, the OCIAA Art Section ceased its activities. Indigenous art, and devoted himself to the task he had begun in previous years to strengthen the link between the Americas.
Over time, enthusiasm diminished, and so did the funds allocate to exhibitions and tours in Latin America. It was foreseeable. Since 1941, the reports stressed several logistical difficulties, excess maintenance costs, and the shipment of materials to perform activities. In many cases, geographical and road restrictions had a high impact on the transfer of the exhibitions, not to mention the delays.
However, as Herrera Ulloa argues, South America became "a testing laboratory for the future art